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The quantum reality problem is that of finding a mathematically precise definition of a sample
space of configurations of beables, events, histories, paths, or other mathematical objects, and a
corresponding probability distribution, for any given closed quantum system. Given a solution, we
can postulate that physical reality is described by one randomly chosen configuration drawn from the
sample space. For a physically sensible solution, this postulate should imply quasiclassical physics
in realistic models. In particular, it should imply the validity of Copenhagen quantum theory
and classical dynamics in their respective domains. A Lorentzian solution applies to relativistic
quantum theory or quantum field theory in Minkowski space and is defined in a way that respects
Lorentz symmetry. We outline a new solution to the non-relativistic and Lorentzian quantum reality
problems, and associated new generalizations of quantum theory.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum theory is a mathematically beautiful theory that unifies all of known physics with the exception of gravity.
Its probabilistic predictions for experimental outcomes have been verified for a very large range of physical phenomena,
and contradicted by no experiment. Yet, as John Bell so eloquently and persuasively argued [7], we do not know what
precisely it is that quantum probabilities are probabilities of. We do not have a mathematically precise description
of what Bell called [8, 9] the “beables” for quantum theory – a sample space of events, or histories, or paths, or
other mathematical objects, on which the quantum probability distribution is defined. This is the quantum reality
problem, sometimes referred to as the measurement problem – rather misleadingly from a modern perspective, since
few physicists now believe that the fundamental laws of nature involve measuring devices per se or that progress can
be made by analysing them. As Bell emphasized, the quantum reality problem becomes particularly conceptually
problematic when we impose the natural condition that any solution should respect the symmetries of special relativity.
We focus here on solutions to the Lorentzian quantum reality problem, i.e. solutions that have this property.
As Bell also stressed, [7], mathematical aesthetics are not the main motivation for solving the quantum reality
problem. The motivation is the following. On the one hand, the impressive successes of quantum theory, and the lack
of compelling alternatives, make it natural to try to treat quantum theory as fundamental, and so to derive everything
else in physics from quantum theory. On the other hand, it appears to us that we live in a quasiclassical world, in which
macroscopic variables are most of the time approximately governed by deterministic equations of motion, but are also
affected by random events of quantum origin. Moreover, it appears as though this quasiclassical world emerged from
an initial quantum state with no initial quasiclassical properties. Given a well-defined probabilistic version of the
quantum theory of closed systems, we can hope to explain these features from within quantum theory, and indeed
to sketch a coherent and unified account of cosmology, classical and quasiclassical dynamics and quantum theory.
Without one, we cannot rigorously derive classical or quasiclassical physics from quantum theory, nor give a coherent
treatment of cosmology from within quantum theory.
The once-standard Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory explicitly accepted these limitations. It is the
hope of going further, and giving a unified framework that includes all of modern physics, that motivates the ongoing
search for a solution.
The first well-known attempt to address the quantum reality problem directly was the pilot wave theory of de
Broglie and Bohm [12, 14], in which the beables are particle trajectories whose evolution is defined by the quantum
wave function by a guidance equation. However, de Broglie and Bohm’s models apply to non-relativistic quantum
mechanics and are inconsistent with special relativity. No fundamentally relativistic generalisation of the models has
been found, nor is there a convincing extension to quantum field theory. Many (though not all) physicists also find
de Broglie and Bohm’s trajectories and guidance equations rather mathematically unnatural and inelegant additions
to quantum theory.
Non-relativistic dynamical collapse models [17, 18] attempt to give another story about physical reality that is
consistent with experiment to date, at the price of changing the dynamics and hence the experimental predictions
of quantum theory. (For some attempts in the direction of relativistic collapse models see [6, 27, 28, 33].) While
2scientifically interesting, these and other generalizations of quantum theory do not address the main question we
focus on here – namely, whether we can find a mathematically precise description of reality consistent with standard
quantum theory.
Another line of thought, initiated by Everett, suggests that quantum theory is deterministic and that pure unitary
quantum evolution holds at all times. The problems with this idea, and with the many incompatible proposals for
some form of “many worlds” quantum theory that it has inspired, continue to be debated [31]. Still, two relatively
uncontroversial points can be made. First, since, according to most modern Everettians, quantum theory is funda-
mentally deterministic, and the appearance of quasiclassical physics is supposed to arise as an approximation via
decoherence, no mathematically precise sample space and probability distribution emerges. Second, many worlds
theories are radically different types of scientific theory from standard “one world” versions of quantum theory (or
indeed from anything previously considered in science) and give a qualitatively different (and fantastically weird)
description of reality.
Many critics are also unpersuaded either that the appearance of quasiclassical physics can in fact be explained by
decoherence, or that a fundamentally deterministic theory can account for an approximate higher level description that
explains the empirical appearance of Born rule probabilities (see e.g. [5, 22, 30]). But even convinced Everettians, who
believe that many worlds theories can give a complete explanation of the Born rule, the appearance of probabilities and
of quasiclassicality, and everything else described by standard physics, should still be (and generally are) interested
in whether we need to invoke many worlds ideas to do all this.
In short, there remains an unresolved and intellectually fascinating question fundamental to our understanding
of quantum theory. Namely, is there a mathematically precise solution to the quantum reality problem, consistent
with the symmetries of special relativity, that gives a probabilistic description of one physical world, consistent
with the quasiclassical combination of classical and quantum physics that we actually observe? Or, if this is too
much to presently hope, given that any fully realistic model of quasiclassical physics would need to describe the real
time evolution of complex physical structures within quantum field theory and quantum gravity, is there at least a
conceptually clear route to defining such a solution?
This paper answers this last question positively. The solution described here uses the strategy of inferring finite
time beables from asymptotic behaviour and many of the other ideas set out in Ref. [23], but is simpler than the
proposals made in that paper.
THE REALITY PROBLEM FOR NONRELATIVISTIC QUANTUM MECHANICS
We should note at the start that the intuitions underlying our proposed solution come from the properties of
relativistic quantum field theories and from the current tentative understanding of the likely asymptotic state of
the universe within presently favoured cosmological models. Thus, although the ideas are described more simply in
nonrelativistic quantum mechanics than in relativistic theories, nonrelativistic quantum mechanics is not ultimately
the most natural setting for them, and our solution will not necessarily give intuitively appealing descriptions of
reality for simple models of nonrelativistic systems, without further assumptions. We discuss further the underlying
intuitions, and the assumptions that need to be introduced into models to reflect them, below, after giving the proposal
in general form.
Suppose that we have a system of N particles, including b indistinguishable bosons and f indistinguishable fermions,
with b+ f ≤ N , and (N − b− f) distinguishable particles. (These choices are made purely to simplify our discussion,
which can easily be extended to allowMb types of bosons and Mf types of fermion, for any integersMb,Mf ≥ 0.) We
take b, f > 1 (otherwise we treat the relevant particle as distinguishable) and label the bosons by {1, . . . , b} and the
fermions by {b+1, . . . , b+ f}; if N − b− f > 0 we label the remaining distinguishable particles by {b+ f +1, . . . , N}.
We also suppose that the N particles have some natural division into two classes, which we label 1 and 2. All
indistinguishable particles of the same type belong to the same class. Both classes contain significant numbers of
particles, and there are significant interactions between the particles in class 1 and those in class 2, which allow the
final states of the class 1 and class 2 particles to be highly correlated.
Our proposal involves (as mathematical abstractions) final and intermediate time measurements of the masses at
points in space, which are functions of particle position operators. Position (more precisely, the mass at a given
position) thus plays a special role as a mathematically preferred observable. We thus suppress spin and any other
internal degrees of freedom to simplify the notation; note that our proposal requires no additional spin or other
measurements to be introduced in systems where they are relevant.
The system’s position space wave function has the appropriate statistics. If ρb is a permutation of {1, . . . , b} and
ρf is a permutation of {b+1, . . . , b+ f}, write ρ = ρb⊗ρf ⊗ IN−b−f for the corresponding permutation of {1, . . . , N}.
3Then we have
ψ(xρ(1), . . . , xρ(N)) = ǫ(ρf )ψ(x1, . . . , xN ) ,
where ǫ is the sign of ρf .
We will treat this as a closed system without external intervention, which comes into existence at t = 0 and
continues to a final time t = T , at which point time and physics end. This is a mathematical device, not a fundamental
assumption about nature. Later we will consider the limit T →∞, which gives a more conventional (although in this
model still non-relativistic) picture in which physics begins at some point in the past and continues forever thereafter.
Suppose we are given the initial state |ψ(0)〉 at t = 0 with wave function
ψ(x1, . . . , xN ; 0) = 〈x1, . . . , xN |ψ(0) 〉 ,
and that we are given a Hamiltonian H . Quantum theory then gives the Schro¨dinger evolution
|ψ(t)〉 = exp(−iHt/h¯)|ψ(0)〉 ,
or in terms of wave functions
ψ(x1, . . . , xN ; t) = exp(−iHt/h¯)ψ(x1, . . . , xN ; 0) .
Now consider, for each of classes 1 and 2, the coresponding mass density function defined by a mass-weighted sum
of position operators
ρ(j)(x; t) =
∑
i∈Cj
miρi(x, t) .
for j = 1, 2. Here the set Cj denotes the labels of all particles in class j, and
ρi(x, t) =
∫
dx1 . . . dxi−1dxi+1 . . . dxN |ψ(x1, . . . xi−1, x, xi+1, . . . , xN ; t)|
2
= 〈ψ(t) |P xi |ψ(t)〉 , (1)
where
P xi = I1 ⊗ · · · Ii−1 ⊗ |x〉i〈x|i ⊗ Ii+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ IN
is the formal projection operator onto the value xi = x of the i-th coordinate. Note that, while P
x
i is not even formally
well defined if i is a bosonic or fermionic label, the sums
∑b
i=1miP
x
i and
∑b+f
i=b+1miP
x
i are. (The identical bosons
have equal masses, m1 = m2 = . . . = mb; similarly mb+1 = mb+2 = . . . = mb+f .)
The operators
∑
imiP
x
i and
∑
imiP
y
i commute. So, formally, we can consider the effect of a simultaneous mea-
surement of all such operators at time t = T . This produces a possible final time distribution
ρf (x, T ) = ρ
(1)
f (x, T ) + ρ
(2)
f (x, T ) =
∑
i
miδ(x− yi) ,
randomly chosen from the sample space of all distributions with total mass
∑
imi, via the probability distribution
defined by |ψ(0)〉, H and the Born rule. This is the first ingredient in our construction of a beable description of
non-relativistic quasiclassical reality. We will take the randomly chosen pair ρ
(1)
f (x, T ) and ρ
(2)
f (x, T ) to define the
“real world” that is chosen from among the sample space of possible worlds that could arise given the initial state and
Hamiltonian. This final time measurement is not meant to be thought of as carried out by any external system: we
treat the N particle universe as a closed system with no external observers or devices. It is simply a mathematical
operation that allows a precise description of the sample space of possible worlds and a corresponding probability
distribution.
Next we consider the expected value of ρ(j)(x, t) (for 0 < t < T ), given the initial state |ψ(0)〉 and Hamiltonian H ,
when we condition on the outcome of our final time measurements producing the final distribution ρ
(j¯)
f (x, T ). Here j¯
denotes the other class to j; thus we consider expected values of ρ(1)(x, t) given the final distribution ρ(2)(x, T ) and
vice versa.
4Since we have a post-selected final outcome, this expectation value depends on precisely which set of commuting
operators are simultaneously measured. For each point in time t, we consider a simultaneous measurement of ρ(j¯)(x, t)
at all points x ∈ R3.
Formally, the relevant expectation value is then given by the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz rule [1], extended to
the case where the intermediate and final projection operators may be degenerate. We write {M jk : k ∈ K} for
the possible nonzero outcomes of measuring the mass of particles in class j at a point in our system, so that each
M jk =
∑
l∈Lml for some nonzero subset L ⊆ C
(j) ⊆ {1, . . . , N}. Write P xM for the projection onto the space of states
with mass M at point x. Then we have
〈ρ(j)(x, t)〉 =
∑
k
Mk
Aj(Mk, x, t, T )
Bj(t, T )
, (2)
where
Aj(Mk, x, t, T ) =
∑
{k1,...,kr :ki∈C(j) ∀i and
∑
r
i=1
Mki+Mk=M
(j)}
∫
dy1 . . . dyr (3)
Tr(Pf exp(−iH(T − t)/h¯)P
x
Mk
N−1∏
i=1
P yiMki
exp(−iHt/h¯)P0 exp(iHt/h¯)P
x
Mk
N−1∏
i=1
P yiMki
exp(iH(T − t)/h¯)) ,
and
Bj(t, T ) =
∑
{k1,...,kr+1:ki∈C(j)∀i and
∑
r+1
i=1
Mki=M
(j)}
∫
dy1 . . . dyr+1 (4)
Tr(Pf exp(−iH(T − t)/h¯)
r+1∏
i=1
P yiMi exp(−iHt/h¯)P0 exp(iHt/h¯)
r+1∏
i=1
P yiMi exp(iH(T − t)/h¯)) .
Here P0 = |ψ(0)〉〈ψ(0)| and Pf is the projection onto the space of states for which the class j¯ particles have final mass
density ρj¯f (x, T ), and
M (j) =
∑
l∈C(j)
ml .
That is, our definition of an expectation value for the mass density of class j particles at intermediate times uses
only the postselected data from the other class, j¯.
That is,
〈ρ(j)(x, t)〉 =
∑
kMk
∑
wt( all outcomes including mass Mk at x)∑
wt( all outcomes )
,
where wt() denotes the pre- and post-selected probability weights used in the above expression, and the outcomes
considered are of simultaneous mass measurements of all the class j particles at all points y ∈ R3. We could also
include projections onto the zero mass eigenspaces at all points other than y1, . . . yr−1, yr in the denominator, and at
all points other than y1, . . . yr−1, x in the numerator. However, these would not change the expressions here, since we
have a fixed number of positive mass particles of total mass
∑
l∈C(j) ml.
This is the second ingredient in our construction: given the final outcomes ρ
(j)
f (x, T ), we take the expressions
ρ
(j)
T (x, t) = 〈ρ
(j)(x, t)〉
just calculated (using the post-selected final conditions for the complementary class j¯ to define the beable for class j)
to define the beables at position x and time t for a universe in which physics runs from time 0 to time T .
The full set of beables describing reality for our first model, in which all physics takes place between times 0 and
T , is thus given by
{ ρ
(j)
T (x, t) : 0 < t < T , x ∈ R
3 , j = 1, 2 } . (5)
5To make further progress, we need a key assumption: quantum physics in our model universe involves non-trivial
interactions between the particles in the two classes at finite times, creating effective records, but becomes, in a sense
to be characterised more precisely, asymptotically trivial as t→∞.
A possible intuition that would support this assumption is that, while initially the particles often are localized in
the same region and interact, eventually all particles that can decaywill have decayed, all particles that are capable
of interacting with one another either do interact or become more and more widely separated, non-gravitational
interactions become rarer and rarer, and the asymptotic evolution is effectively described by a free quantum field
theory. This intuition relies on being able to think of the asymptotic physical state as composed of elementary
particles, or at least as behaving qualitatively as though it were. It is supported by some cosmological scenarios that
are presently taken seriously, for example (and most cleanly) in “big rip” scenarios. To model something like this in
the nonrelativistic setting requires in particular that interactions between particles in class 1 and those in class 2 are
initially significant but are switched off, or become negligible, at large times.
A weaker intuition, still adequate to justify the assumption, is that the outcome of a typical indeterministic quasi-
classical event leaves an indelible asymptotic record in the mass densities of one or both classes (both being required if
the event itself is quasiclassical with respect to variables defined by both classes). That is, in principle, a measurement
of the class mass densities at large final time T allows one to infer all initially undetermined outcomes, and so the
entire history of quasiclassical physics, which is encoded in the inferred mass density distributions at times between
0 and T .
For example, suppose that the Schro¨dinger equation creates what is traditionally thought of as a measurement
event at time t < T . That is, suppose that, around time t, a quantum system interacts with an apparatus whose
pointer initially has a single approximately localized position, and creates a superposition of two states corresponding
to macroscopically separated approximately localized pointer positions at time t + δ. Suppose also that the pointer
comprises particles in class 1, and its environment contains particles in class 2 that interact with it. In a fairly general
class of such models, the position degrees of freedom of many particles in the environment typically become coupled
to the pointer positions, and produce effective records (i.e. multiply redundant subsystems that are persistently
correlated with the original data) of those positions in the environment. The class 2 mass density measurement at
the final time T distinguishes different states of these records and so indirectly measures the pointer position at times
soon after t+ δ, whether or not the pointer itself remains intact or quasiclassical indefinitely.
Of course, the point of giving a precise definition of reality in terms of beables is to go beyond intuition. In our
models, a definite quasiclassical measurement event is ultimately a higher level description, which can generally only
be approximately characterised in the quasiclassical theory based on the beables. Such an event occurs if and only if it
leaves effective records in the final time mass density measurement(s) for the relevant class(es). Thus, a hypothetical
experiment successfully demonstrating interference between two paths of a macroscopic object would not produce
definite events associated with one or other path, since the interference implies near-perfect isolation of the beams
from all other particles, and hence a typical final time mass density measurement outcome will give almost no path
information.
Intuitions aside, then, the precise assumption we need to make is that the probability distribution for the possible
configurations of beables describing reality (5) within each fixed time interval [0, t], for any t < T , has a well-defined
limit as T → ∞. Given models in which this holds, we can then test whether typical beable distributions represent
quasiclassical reality appropriately [39].
Our asymptotic assumption translates as follows. Let C
(j)
t (for j = 1, 2) be any coarse-grained subsets of the sets
of continuous functions
{ρ(j)(x, t′) : x ∈ R3, 0 ≤ t′ ≤ t}
obeying (in our non-relativistic model) the constraint∫
d3xρ(j)(x, t′) =
∑
l∈C(j)
ml
for any t′. Let
ProbT (C
(1)
t , C
(2)
t )
be the joint probability that {ρ
(j)
T (x, t
′) : x ∈ R3, 0 ≤ t′ ≤ tf} belong to C
(j)
t for j = 1 and 2, given our constructed
probability density function on the set of possible ρ
(j)
T . Then, assuming that
Prob∞(C
(1)
t , C
(2)
t ) = lim
T→∞
ProbT (C
(1)
t , C
(2)
t )
6exists, we define this expression to be the probability that reality up to time t is described by a time-evolving
mass distribution for class j particles belonging to C
(j)
t , for j = 1 and 2. This, together with the additivity of
the probability measure on finite disjoint measurable subsets of the sample space, completes the definition of the
probability distribution on the beable configurations, i.e. on the possible descriptions of reality, in this non-relativistic
model.
We will consider other non-relativistic beable models below. First, though, we discuss relativistic generalizations
of the above model.
THE REALITY PROBLEM FOR RELATIVISTIC QUANTUM THEORY
It is not presently possible to give a completely rigorous discussion of the reality problem for any physically relevant
relativistic quantum field theory in Minkowski space, because no version of relativistic quantum field theory is well
enough understood to allow quasiclassical equations to be rigorously derived from first principles. We cannot even give
a fully mathematically rigorous quantum field-theoretic description of any realistic physical experiment – of electrons
passing from a source through a two-slit region and registering at detectors, for example. Evidently, then, we cannot
hope to prove rigorously that a particular mathematical construction attached to such a description gives a description
of physical reality with any given desired property.
However, we can aim to separate the conceptual issue posed by the reality problem from the technical issues that
prevent us from carrying out complete calculations describing realistic experiments, or other phenomena characterised
by quasiclassical physics, in quantum field theory. We can also hope to make it plausible that a proposed solution
correctly describes quasiclassical reality in realistic models. This is the strategy we follow here.
We now suppose that the initial state |ψ0〉 is given on some spacelike hypersurface S0, and that some relativistic
unitary evolution law is given. The Tomonaga-Schwinger formalism allows us to define formally the evolved state
|ψS〉 on any hypersurface S in the future of S0 via a unitary operator US0S . These future hypersurfaces S play the
same role in our relativistic formalism as the final time coordinate, t = T , does in the non-relativistic case.
As in the non-relativistic case, we may assume that the relevant fields are naturally divided into two (or more)
classes. Our reason for employing this construction in the non-relativistic case is the unphysical nature of non-
relativistic propagators, which imply that propagations from a single space point x to any other point y in any time
t are equally probable.
Since relativistic propagators encode the causal structure of the underlying space-time, and tend rapidly to zero
outside the future light cone, it seems to us an open question – which depends on the details of the fields and their
interactions and the underlying assumptions about the initial state – whether dividing the particles up into classes
is necessarily required in the case of relativistic field theory. Our relativistic constructions could be considered for
a single class of particles, in which case the stress-energy expectations at intermediate points would be defined by
post-selecting on the total final hypersurface mass-energy density operator. We intend to explore this possibility
further in future.
We discuss here the case of two classes, j = 1 and 2, analogous to the discussion given explicitly in the non-
relativistic case above. Our definitions can easily be applied to the case of a single class. Both the relativistic and
non-relativistic definitions can also easily be extended to other post-selection rules, involving more than two classes;
we discuss these possibilities in the next section.
We use the following natural generalization of the final time measurements of mass density in our non-relativistic
models. For any given smooth hypersurface S in the future of the initial hypersurface S0, we consider the effect of
joint measurements of the class 1 and 2 local mass-energy density operators T
(j)
S (x) = T
(j)
µν (x)nµnν , carried out at
each point x ∈ S, where nµ is the forward-pointing timelike unit 4-vector orthogonal to the tangent plane of S at x.
We assume here the two mass-density operators commute.
This gives us a probability distribution on possible mass-energy distributions t
(j)
S (x) on S. Conditioned on any
given outcome of the t
(j)
S (x), we wish to calculate expectation values of the stress-energy tensors for the field classes,
〈T
(j¯)
µν (y)〉, at each point y between S0 and S.
We again define these expectation values using the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz formalism. As in the non-
relativistic case, we need to take appropriate limits. Again, because we have a post-selected final outcome, the
expectation value 〈T
(j¯)
µν (y)〉 depends on the other commuting observables that we consider as jointly measured. Because
we no longer have an absolute time coordinate, we need to define the relevant measurement more carefully.
For any point y in the future of S0, define the effective past boundary Λ(y) of y in our model to be Λ0(y) ∪ S0(y),
where Λ0(y) is the set of points in the lightlike past of y and the future of S0, and S0(y) is the set of points in S0 not
7in the past light cone of y. Let {Si(y)} be a sequence of smooth spacelike hypersurfaces that include y such that
lim
i→∞
Si(y) = Λ(y) .
Consider a joint measurement of T
(j¯)
µν (y) and of T
(j¯)
Si(y)
(x) for all x ∈ Si(y) other than y. Given the initial state |ψ0〉
on S0 and the relevant post-conditioned final measurement outcomes t
(j)
S (x) on S, the ABL rule gives a value
〈T (j¯)µν (y)〉Si(y)
for the pre- and post-selected stress energy tensor expectation value which, as our notation suggests, may in general
depend on Si(y). It is important to note that, as in the non-relativistic case, this expectation value depends on the
full specification of the measurement. To apply the ABL rule, we need to include all possible outcomes of all the
measurements of T
(j¯)
Si(y)
(x). We comment further on this later.
Finally, we define
〈T (j¯)µν (y)〉 = lim
i→∞
〈T (j¯)µν (y)〉Si(y) ,
assuming both that this limit exists and that it is independent of the chosen limit sequence {Si(y)}.
For a toy model in which all of physics takes place between S0 and S, the two functions t
(j)
S (x) on S define the
particular real world that was randomly selected. The pre- and post-selected expectation values 〈T
(j¯)
µν (y)〉, for y
between S0 and S and j = 1 and 2, are the beables corresponding to the given real world, and define physical reality
between S0 and S in our model.
We then consider the asymptotic limit in which S tends to the infinite future of S0. Suppose that S1 is some fixed
hypersurface in the future of S0. Let C
(k)
S1
(for k = 1 and 2) be any coarse-grained subsets of the sets of continuous
tensor functions {t
(k)
µν (x) : x ∈ R4, S0 < x < S1}, where the notation S0 < x < S1 means that x lies in the future of
some point in S0 and the past of some point in S1. Let
ProbS(C
(1)
S1
, C
(2)
S1
)
be the probability that {t
(k)
µν (x) : x ∈ R4, S0 < x < S1} belongs to C
(k)
S1
, for k = 1 and 2, given our constructed
probability density function on the set of possible functions T (j)(x) : S → R. Then, assuming that
Prob∞(C
(1)
S1
, C
(2)
S1
) = lim
S→∞
(ProbS(C
(1)
S1
, C
(2)
S1
))
exists, we define this to be the probability that reality between S0 and S1 is described by time-evolving mass dis-
tributions belonging to C
(k)
S1
for k = 1 and 2. This completes our proposed description of reality in this relativistic
model.
Note that an interesting alternative model can be defined by using the effective future boundary (defined analo-
gously) in place of the effective past boundary. Again, this requires defining the expectation value at x via a limit
using measurements on spacelike hypersurfaces that tend to the effective future boundary of x.
Another interesting possibility to explore, in discrete finite lattice models of space-time, would be to define the
expectation value at x via a measurement on the first (or last) spacelike hypersurface through x from a foliation
defined by stochastic forward time evolution from S0, as in [15].
DISCUSSION
We have described a new way of defining a mathematically precise description of physical reality that is not only
consistent with standard non-relativistic quantum mechanics, but also involves only familiar quantities that are simply
defined within the theory, namely expectation values of mass density. In contrast to Everettian ideas, this solution to
the reality problem describes a randomly chosen single real physical real world, selected from a well-defined probability
distribution in an entirely standard and unproblematic way. In contrast to de Broglie-Bohm theory, we believe our
solution will appear mathematically natural to anyone familiar with quantum theory. In contrast to dynamical collapse
models, our solution requires no change to quantum dynamics.
8We have also extended this to a Lorentz covariant solution of the quantum reality problem for quantum field theory
in Minkowski space. As in the non-relativistic case, this solution requires assumptions about the asymptotic behaviour
of solutions to quantum dynamics given a realistic unitary evolution law and initial conditions.
Our asymptotic assumptions can be tested directly in reasonably complex models in the non-relativistic case, with
the caveat we noted above: to be reasonable tests, such models need to include assumptions that reflect the underlying
field-theoretic and cosmological intuitions. Relativistic quantum field theory is not itself rigorously enough developed
to allow either our asymptotic assumptions, or the beable configurations they are intended to define, to be directly
calculated for complex systems. Our solution to the reality problem in this case thus involves formal definitions. It
could, however, still be tested in hybrid toy models in which, for example, the asymptotic early and late time states
are taken to have fixed finite particle number.
Of course, no proposal for solving the reality problem in relativistic quantum field theory can be fully rigorously
tested, given our presently limited understanding of the latter. Ar present, the best one can hope for is to show that
there is a route to a solution with no evident conceptual obstacles, and this we claim to have achieved. Our proposal’s
ability to reproduce quasiclassical physics, and the limiting behaviours it requires, can be tested in toy models.
Relativistic quantum theory has been, purportedly, one of our two fundamental theories of nature, and may yet
subsume the other – general relativity – in some future quantum theory of gravity. And yet, to date, it has been
completely unclear whether it admits any conceptually clear description of physical reality, or allows a conceptually
clear derivation of classical dynamics or other higher-level theories. This has left serious questions over its status
as a fundamental theory – in Bell’s words, it has seemed to “carry the seeds of its own destruction” – and led Bell
and many others to suspect that these problems can only be solved by a deeper theory with different dynamics and
experimental predictions. Replacing these fundamental conceptual problems by technical questions about asymptotic
behaviour – in a theory that has in any case always been understood to have deep unresolved technical questions –
seems to us a considerable advance.
We do not know for certain whether some appropriately further extended version of our asymptotic assumptions
holds true in realistic cosmologies that include a theory of gravity, or, a fortiori, whether it holds true in our universe.
However, the essential idea that final states are asymptotically well-defined superpositions of states of different mass
density configurations is at least consistent with some standard cosmological pictures. It is also consistent with the
standard intuition that quantum field theory should be understood as describing processes from which asymptotically
well-defined particle states emerge.
Modulo these caveats, we believe our solution method is currently the most promising way of obtaining a physically
sensible description of a single quasiclassical world consistent with quantum theory and special relativity, and plausibly
consistent with gravity and cosmology.
The method could, of course, be applied to other physical quantities, and so our solution is not unique. For
example, probability or charge densities could be used instead of mass densities in the non-relativistic case. In the
relativistic case, the final measurements could be of Jµnµ, and the pre- and post-selected expectation values of the
electromagnetic 4-current Jµ could be used instead of that of the stress-energy tensor to define the real beables.
Other possibilities could also be considered. Nonetheless, relatively few options seem particularly natural, and
among these, mass density (in the non-relativistic case) and the stress-energy tensor (in the relativistic case) seem to
us the most natural. A strong additional motivation for focussing on these options is that they suggest new ideas to
explore in unifying quantum theory with gravity: we discuss these further below.
There are also various ways in which the particles (in the non-relativistic case) or fields (in the relativistic case) could
naturally be divided into two or more classes, and various post-selection rules that could be considered. For example,
one might take the classes to be bosons and fermions, or massive and massless particles (or, more speculatively, matter
and gravitational fields, or ordinary and dark matter, in the appropriate contexts). Which choice(s) of classes are most
natural depends on the Hamiltonian and the asymptotic form of the final state (and thus also on the initial state). Any
given physical theory in which these are specified should allow relatively few options that seem particularly natural.
In the variants of our model in which several classes are considered, one natural rule for defining the class j
mass-densities is to post-select on the final outcomes for all the other classes; again, other rules could be considered.
Once again, though, relatively few options for choosing classes, or post-selection rules, are likely to seem particularly
natural, given a specific theory.
One other variant of our model that is worth noting is that in which there are two classes of particles or fields,
but only the mass density (respectively mass-energy density) for one of them defines beables. While this seems less
natural if the ultimate aim is to couple the mass(-energy) beables directly to a quasiclassical gravitational field, it
seems adequate as a solution to the quantum reality problem per se: a quasiclassical picture of reality can seemingly
be described padequately in terms of the mass-energy densities of fermions, or massive particles, for example.
9Implications for earlier approaches to the quantum reality problem
Although admittedly incomplete, this work raises, in our view, new questions about previous approaches to the
reality problem. For example:
Why resort to de Broglie-Bohm theory, with its inelegant combination of particle-like trajectories guided by an
evolving quantum wave function, if a solution to the non-relativistic quantum reality problem exists that uses only
simple quantities that arise naturally in quantum theory? The case against de Broglie-Bohm theory seems all the
stronger when we consider the relativistic reality problem, and the fundamental conceptual problems that arise when
one tries to define any fully Lorentz covariant version of de Broglie-Bohm field theory.
Similarly, why resort to many-worlds ideas, if there is a simple one-world solution to the reality problem? Why try
to deal with the problem of the appearance of quasiclassicality in many-worlds quantum theory, and the necessary
imprecision in defining the branching worlds, when we can give a simple picture with a single, precisely defined
quasiclassical world? And why struggle with what seems to many (e.g. [5, 22, 30]) the hopeless task of trying to make
sense of probability in a deterministic many-worlds theory, if a straightforwardly probabilistic one world description
is available?
Moreover, if there is a reasonably natural way of solving the reality problem within standard quantum mechanics,
do we need to consider collapse models, with their ad hoc assumptions and extra parameters? The question seems
even more apt given that this solution also extends naturally to relativistic quantum theory and – while admittedly
not rigorously defined in this context – still appears to pose fewer technical or conceptual problems than attempts at
relativistic generalizations of collapse models.
Bell said [10] of Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber’s original discrete dynamical collapse model [18]: “I am particularly struck
by the fact that the model is as Lorentz invariant as it could be in the nonrelativistic version. It takes away the ground
of my fear that any exact formulation of quantum mechanics must conflict with fundamental Lorentz invariance.”
The ideas for a solution to the reality problem outlined in this paper take away the ground of my own prior hunch
that any exact Lorentz invariant formulation of quantum theory must necessarily alter the dynamical equations (as
the GRW theory and other dynamical collapse models do). Given the extraordinary beauty of both special relativity
and quantum theory this prompts the question: if we can solve the reality problem and retain both theories intact,
(why) would we want to consider alternatives that break one or the other?
Generalizations of quantum theory
1. Generalizations using beable guided quantum theory
This last question has some real force – in particular, if the ideas outlined here work, then the case for dynamical
collapse models does seem weakened. However, it is by no means purely rhetorical. There are still good reasons for
continuing to explore generalizations of quantum theory, and indeed the solutions to the quantum reality problem
described above also suggest intriguing new directions for such exploration.
One entirely uncontroversial motivation is that, however beautiful quantum theory appears, and even if the reality
problem and all other conceptual and technical issues can be resolved within standard quantum theory, it still may
turn out not to be the final theory of nature. We want to test our best current theories as strongly as we can. To
do this, we need alternatives against which to test it – and ideally, we would like parametrised classes of alternatives
to quantify the extent to which it has been tested. Such alternatives need not be as beautiful or compelling as our
best theory – indeed, almost by definition, they will not be. They can still serve a valuable role as foils, or, to be
open-minded about it, as ways of pointing out domains in which our best theory might in fact break down – even if
not necessarily quite for the reasons those alternative theories suggest.
There is, though, also a strong case for taking generalizations of quantum theory seriously on their own terms [24].
Any solution to the quantum reality problem defines a probability distribution on configurations of beables. It is
perfectly logically consistent for this distribution to be defined only by the initial conditions and quantum dynamics,
as our solutions are. But there is, arguably, something oddly epiphenomenal about the status of the beables in such
a theory. On the one hand, they are the building blocks of physical reality. On the other hand, they seem to play
a mathematically secondary role to that of the evolving quantum state. It determines their probability distribution,
while they have no effect on it.
Of course, it could be that nature is described this way. It is hard to know just how much weight to put on the
intuition that physically crucial quantities in a fundamental theory should play a more central role in the mathematics
[40]. Still, the intuition is there. It also motivates a class of generalizations of quantum theory, which moreover suggest
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a new way of thinking about quantum theory and gravity. So, whether or not the underlying intuition is fundamentally
right, it suggests potentially valuable new directions for theoretical physics.
Recall that, given initial conditions and dynamics, our solution defines a probability distribution on configurations
of beables – in the form of space and time-dependent mass density or stress-energy tensor expectation values – that
define reality. Any such construction can be generalized by taking the probability distribution to depend not only on
the initial conditions and dynamics but also on the beable configuration itself [24]. To give just one example among
countless possibilities, the probability of configurations could be enhanced or suppressed depending on some global
measure of its uniformity over time. Different generalizations can be obtained from versions of our solution involving
charge density or other quantities.
The choice of stress-energy tensor expectation values as beables for relativistic quantum field theory is particularly
suggestive if we allow the probability distribution for configurations of these beables to depend on laws not defined
only by the evolving quantum state. This suggests the thought that it might be possible to unify gravity and quantum
theory via probabilistic quasiclassical laws that couple the background geometry directly to the quasiclassical beables
defining a matter distribution, without necessarily requiring any quantised gravitational field.
The idea here is not to restrict to defining versions of semi-classical gravity by equations of the form
Gµν + gµνΛ = 8π〈Tµν〉 ,
where the expectation value on the right hand side is defined by one of the recipes given above (summing over the
expectation values for the classes if there are two or more classes). Such equations need not generally be every-
where consistent. Instead, the goal is to extend the probability distributions defined above on beable configurations,
represented by 〈Tµν〉, to joint probability distributions on Riemannian manifolds and tensor fields defined on such
manifolds, with the property that the quasiclassical Einstein equations emerge as approximately valid in appropriate
domains. We intend to explore this further in future work.
Relation to previous work
The solution to the reality problem outlined here uses the strategy of inferring finite time beables from asymptotic
behaviour, and many of the other ideas, set out in Ref. [23], but is simpler than the proposals made in that paper.
While the simplicity of the solution given here is particularly appealing, and its suggestion of a relationship to gravity
particularly intriguing, those earlier proposals still remain potentially interesting alternatives, in our view. Both the
solution proposed here and those in Ref. [23] have features in common with other earlier ideas in the literature.
The fundamental significance of the quantum reality problem and the possibility of finding a mathematical solution
was perhaps first realised by de Broglie and Bohm [12, 14]. The concept of beable is due to Bell [8, 9], who also
illustrated the variety of possible types of beable solution to the reality problem and focussed attention on the
Lorentzian quantum reality problem [10].
Aharonov and collaborators [1, 3, 34] have long stressed the value of considering both initial and final states in
order to illuminate the properties of and interpret quantum theory from various perspectives. Related ideas were
previously considered by Watanabe [35] Suggestions for interpretations of quantum theory in terms of initial and final
states have been made by Davidon [13] and Aharonov and Gruss [2]. From the perspective adopted here, one major
limitation of these latter ideas is their reliance on intuitive definitions of measurement and classicality, which are
unsatisfactorily imprecise in any setting and especially problematic in the context of cosmology; see [7, 23] for further
discussion. Another fundamental problem, from the perspective of those looking for a new one-world solution to the
reality problem, is a super-Everettian ontology that includes the evolving forward wave function.
The idea of defining cosmological models with independent initial and final boundary conditions, using a decoherent
histories version of the ABL rule, was discussed by Gell-Mann and Hartle [16]. The possibility of defining cosmological
models and other generalizations of the quantum theory of closed systems by going beyond boundary conditions, and
considering a sequence of constraints on the system’s evolution, was proposed in Ref. [25] and developed and discussed
further in Ref. [24]. The potential uses of environmental records in making sense of quantum theory and quantum
cosmology have been stressed by Zurek and collaborators [11, 37, 38] and by Gell-Mann and Hartle [16], among others.
While all of these contributions have been influential and relevant to our discussion, none of the above authors have
proposed a mathematically precise solution to the Lorentzian quantum reality problem in the sense defined by Bell
and considered here.
Mass density beable ontologies were first proposed for non-relativistic collapse models by Pearle and Squires ([29];
see also [19]). An extension of these ontologies to relativistic collapse models using constructions previously defined
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in [20, 21] was proposed in [6]. These proposals apply to generalizations of quantum theory rather than to quantum
theory itself. We presently see our relativistic solution as more natural and see the path to rigorizing it as having
fewer (although still considerable) technical obstacles.
We also see our proposed solutions as calling into question part of the original motivation for dynamical collapse
models. It should be noted, though, that one possible motivation for dynamical collapse models is the desire for a
theory that effectively ensures that macroscopic superpositions essentially never take place, even in hypothetical future
experiments in which technology allows us either to isolate macroscopic systems for long times, or to control their
environments, in such a way that quantum theory would predict a genuine macroscopic superposition and an ensuing
quantum interference pattern. Our solutions suggest an ontology in which all significant components of the macroscopic
superposition have corresponding beable trails in such experiments. This does not seem evidently problematic: there
is no logical inconsistency in such a description, nor any contradiction with experiment or observation to date. Still,
those who prefer the hunch that nature abhors a macroscopic superposition will prefer collapse models or others with
this feature.
Of course, all these various questions certainly deserve further analysis. We also wish to stress that, whether or
not they ultimately prove relevant to nature, dynamical collapse models remain in our view a landmark intellectual
achievement in the development of work on the quantum reality problem, and that there remains a scientific case for
exploring them simply because they are testable generalizations of quantum theory.
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APPENDIX 1: BEABLE MODELS BASED ON OTHER DEFINITIONS
In this appendix we consider alternative strategies for defining beables, applicable to both non-relativistic and
relativistic models. We make the same assumptions as previously about the initial state and asymptotically defined
final conditions.
Expectation values defined by measurements at a single point
In our non-relativistic model, we defined the beable at the point (x, t) in terms of an expectation value 〈ρ(x, t)〉.
This expectation value was defined via the ABL rule for a joint measurement of mass density at all points y on the
surface of constant time t. We could, instead, have defined an expectation value, which we denote 〈ρ(x, t)〉x, by
applying the ABL rule for a single measurement of the operator ρ(x, t).
As Aharonov and Vaidman’s box “paradoxes” [4] illustrate, there are final states for which this would give a
different beable distribution, with somewhat counterintuitive properties. The beables for a single particle in a three
box example would suggest that its entire mass was simultaneously in two distinct regions (with some further nonzero
mass density expectation in a third). Mass would thus not generally be conserved at the beable level.
This is aesthetically worrying, and even more troubling if one hopes that the mass density beables play a significant
role in combining quantum theory and gravity (a possibility we consider further below). Nonetheless, we should note
that such a description is not logically inconsistent, and it is not immediately evident to us that it is incapable of
reproducing quasiclassical physics. In principle, a beable version of quantum theory might give a counter-intuitive
picture of reality in microscopic experiments (or indeed in macroscopic experiments that are to date unperformed)
and still allow the derivation of the correct higher-level quasiclassical laws in the right regime.
Similar comments apply to the relativistic models. We could define a stress-energy tensor beable 〈Tµν(y)〉y as the
ABL expectation value for a measurement of Tµν(y) alone. This has what might be seen as the advantage of dispensing
with a definition based on a limit of spacelike hypersurfaces that approximate and tend to the past light cone. It
has the same counter-intuitive features as its non-relativistic counterpart in its description of three-box experiments,
however.
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We should also note that, while the beable models we defined earlier give more intuitively sensible descriptions of
three-box experiments, we would not expect them to agree with all prior intuitions in their descriptions of every closed
quantum system. For example, the stress-energy tensor beable 〈Tµν(y)〉 need not generally satisfy conservation laws
everywhere, and cannot be directly used as a source in Einstein’s equations for a semiclassical treatment of gravity.
(Indeed, no quasiclassical derivation of Einstein’s equations involving macroscopic quantum experiments can be valid
everywhere [26].)
In summary, models in which the beables are defined by single point expectation values have decidedly odd features.
While these make such models seem presently less attractive, we do not feel they presently exclude them. More analysis
of the relationship between the beable distributions in these models and quasiclassical variables is needed.
Comments on weak operator values and beables
Another candidate beable in our relativistic models could be the modulus of a generalised form of the so-called
weak value [2, 4] of the stress-energy tensor
Aµν(x)w =
∣∣∣∣
(
Tr(Tµν(x)PSTµν(x)P0)
Tr(PSP0)
)∣∣∣∣
1/2
.
Here PS is the projection onto the space of states whose mass-energy distributions ts(x) agree with that randomly
selected on the final hypersurface S, P0 = |ψ0〉〈ψ0| is the projection onto the initial state on S0. These are unitarily
evolved backwards and forwards, respectively, to any chosen spacelike hypersurface S′ through x, and the inner
products are calculated on S′: we suppress these details in our notation.
Similar comments apply to this and other quantities derived from weak expectation values or decoherence functions.
Such quantities behave similarly to the single point expectation values in three-box experiments, so that a single
particle would appear in the beable description to be located in more than one box, and have other peculiar properties
(see e.g. [32]). This does not logically exclude them as candidate beables capable of describing quasiclassical physics,
but motivates further careful analysis.
APPENDIX 2: FURTHER GENERALIZATIONS OF QUANTUM THEORY
Generalizations by taking finite limit parameters
Consider again our non-relativistic model, in which a mass distribution is obtained at final time T , and then used
to define mass density distributions at times 0 < t < T . These expressions are calculated by using projectors P∆ρf
onto the set of states with final mass distribution in a neighbourhood ∆ of ρf (x, T ) and taking the limit as the size
of ∆ tends to zero. Finally, we take the limit T →∞. These limits are intended to reproduce a quasiclassical reality
consistent with standard quantum theory in realistic models.
To produce generalisations of quantum theory, we can take T , and if we wish also ∆, to be fixed finite param-
eters. Intuitively, if T is large compared to the duration of a quantum experiment, this gives predictions almost
indistinguishable from those of standard quantum theory for that experiment.
Of course, taking the finite T version of the model literally suggests that reality ceases after time T has elapsed – even
though (on a standard reading) the quantum dynamics may continue to be eventful long afterward. Our recommended
attitude to this is not to take the model literally on this point. A commonly held view of dynamical collapse models is
that although the mathematical details of their collapse mechanisms are ad hoc, and it is hard to believe that either
they or the associated ontologies are fundamentally correct, the models are nonetheless interesting generalizations of
quantum theory. They make an intellectually significant point – altering quantum dynamics somewhat radically alters
the ontology and gives new solutions to the quantum reality problem – and also point to interesting experimental tests.
A model does not need to be completely right in order to point in a direction that is theoretically or experimentally
fruitful to explore. Similarly, finite T and ∆ versions of our models show that altering quantum theory gives a
well-defined realist ontology, without any assumption about the asymptotic dynamics, and in a way that affects the
predictions for quasiclassical dynamics and experiment so subtly as to be essentially undetectable.[41]
Another possible approach to finite T models would be to construct versions in which “final measurements” are
made repeatedly on timescales of order T , and the chosen reality depends on a sequence of final measurement outcomes
in such a way that it evolves smoothly. At first sight, such models look mathematically rather ad hoc, since one can
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imagine many recipes of this type, none of which seems particularly natural. They also look likely to have physically
peculiar consequences, in which reality is something like a real superposition (with time-evolving weights) of a sequence
of independently randomly chosen realities defined by measurements at times ≈ T,≈ 2T, . . .. Perhaps, though, there
is scope to construct more natural models by variations on these ideas: we leave this for future exploration.
Comments on relativistic generalizations
One might also investigate “finite proper time” generalizations of our relativistic models. Given initial data on a
spacelike hypersurface S, and a time parameter τ , we can define a finite version of the models given any Lorentz
covariant rule that produces a final hypersurface S′ that depends (stochastically or deterministically) on S and τ ,
with the property that S′ is always in the future of S and that the maximum proper time between points on S and S′
is a function of τ . Such rules can be naturally defined in finite lattice models [15]. It would be interesting to explore
continuous versions in Minkowski space, or indeed analogous rules in quantum gravity using natural definitions of
cosmological time [36].
Again, a literal reading of such models suggests that reality exists only between S and S′; again, our preferred
attitude would be not to take any such model so literally. Another feature is that the choice of hypersurfaces S, S′
suggests some sort of preferred coordinate choice, even if the rules relating S′ to S are Lorentz covariant. This may
not necessarily be problematic – after all, standard general relativistic cosmological models can also include both
preferred proper time coordinates and associated spacelike hypersurfaces – but requires careful discussion. Again, we
leave these preliminary ideas for future exploration.
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